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Abstract
A new simple model of financial market is proposed, based on
the sequential and inter-temporal nature of trader-trader interaction,
and on a new simple trading strategy space. In this pattern-based
speculation model, the traders open and close their positions explicitly.
Information ecology is strikingly similar to that of the Minority Game
which suggest to reinterpret the latter as a model of synchronisation of
predictability exploitation. Naive and sophisticated agents are shown
to give rise to very different phenomenology
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Agent-based modelling is a way to mimic financial market phenomenology
that focuses on individual behaviour (Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer and
Tayler 1997, Levy, Levy and Solomon 2000, Lux and Marchesi 1999, Brock
and Hommes 1997, Hommes 2005, Challet and Zhang 1997, Giardina and
Bouchaud 2002, Andersen and Sornette 2003, Cont, Ghoulmie and Nadal
2005). Because this approach requires to find the right balance between
simple and non-trivial rules, the complexity of the agents varies tremendously
from model to model. At the same time, such models bring insights into
financial market dynamics as long as they are amenable to analysis. As a
consequence, the best strategy for building and studying this kind of models is
to start from well-understood specimens, and either to push their boundaries,
or to borrow their framework and create a new breed of models.
The best analysis is provided by exact solutions. However, heterogeneous
agent-based models (HAM) are inherently harder to solve analytically than
traditional representative agent models (see however Hommes (2005) for a
review of the Economics and Behavioural Finance literature on tractable
HAM). Parameter heterogeneity, for instance in the case of price return ex-
trapolation of trend-followers, can be solved by standard methods (see Brock
and Hommes (1997) and variants). But for more complex heterogeneity,
as when the pair-wise interaction strength varies amongst the agents, more
powerful methods are needed. This is why the solution to the El Farol bar
problem (Arthur 1994) could not be found until sophisticated methods first
designed for disordered physical systems (Me´zard, Parisi and Virasoro 1987)
were used (Challet, Ottino and Marsili 2004, Coolen 2005); in principle, these
methods solve exactly any HAM where the interaction strength is indepen-
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dent from the physical distance between two agents. This is why HAM are
a natural meeting point of Economics and Physics. An important contribu-
tion of Econophysics to HAM is the derivation of the Minority Game (MG)
(Challet and Zhang 1997) from the El Farol bar problem, and its numerous
variants (Challet 2005). Players in a minority game are rewarded when they
act against the crowd. One key ingredient of the MG is a simple, well-defined
strategy space of finite dimension, made up of look-up tables prescribing a
binary action for all possible market states.
Most of HAM literature, both from Economics and Physics, rests on the
assumption that the agents have an action horizon of not more than one time
step. In other words, they take a decision at a given time step in order to
optimise some quantity at next time step. This might be justified if the con-
sidered time step is long enough. However it is obvious that real-life specula-
tion implies that the traders have partially overlapping asset holding periods,
with no systematic synchronisation. The closest approach in Economics liter-
ature is that of overlapping generation models and their numerous extensions
(Allais 1947, Samuelson 1958, Geneakoplos and Polemarchakis 1991). The
very fact that after many years almost all agent-based market models are
still built with one-time step strategies1 is an indication that finding a strat-
egy space of finite dimension suitable for the proper modelling of speculation
is difficult. The challenge is to find a strategy space that allows for inter-
temporal actions, hence, that should give a good reason to the traders for
opening and closing their positions, and an equally good reason for holding
1In some models the agents do try to predict two time-steps ahead, but cannot hold
their positions (Rothenstein and Pawelzik 2003).
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them. Its parametrisation should be as simple as possible so as to minimise
the number of parameters, while having a dimensionality under control.
Although the MG is sometimes regarded as having some relationship with
financial markets, the latter is intriguing and has been difficult to understand
fully. On the one hand, a minority game is compatible with the requirements
that markets are competitive and negative sum games from the point of view
of investors. On the other hand bubbles do not exist in Minority Games, and
seem to be a consequence of a kind of majority game. Markets are rather
escape games (Slanina and Zhang 2001), where one wishes to enter the mar-
ket before the majority enters and to withdraw before the majority with-
draws, i.e. anticipate to the crowd twice; $-games reduce the escape game by
only asking to anticipate the majority of the next time step (Giardina and
Bouchaud 2002, Andersen and Sornette 2003).
In this paper, I first derive the correct market payoff that clarifies once
for all the minority/majority nature of financial markets and then introduce
a model of speculation based on a new simple and powerful strategy space.
It will allow for the reinterpretation of the MG as a model of competition for
predictability.
1 Nature of financial markets
The main reason why financial markets’ nature is still somewhat unclear after
so many years is due to their inter-temporal essence: all the traders are not
active at the same time, hence perfect synchronisation cannot be achieved;
even worse, all the trade orders arrive sequentially, hence simultaneity is a
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theoretician’s phantasm at best —which is rarely recognised in the literature.
Let us review carefully the process of opening and closing a position.2
Placing oneself in event time τ , which increases by one unit whenever an
order is placed, makes the discussion easier. Physical time will be denoted
by t. At time ti = t(τi) in physical time, or τi in event time, trader i decides
to open a position ai = ±1 by placing a market order; at this time, the
last paid price is p(τi).
3 The key observation is that his physical reaction
time δti that includes communication delays and possibly the time needed
to make a conscious decision, results in a delay in event time of δτi; δτi − 1
is the number of trades executed between ti and the transaction of agent i,
hence, varies from transaction to transaction depending on market activity;
the transaction takes place at time τi + δτi and log-price p(τi + δτi).
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[Figure 1 around here]
During that time period, the order book changes; as a consequence p(ti+
δti) differs from p(ti) by the sum of all the price changes caused by the δτi−1
orders executed between ti and ti + δti that were placed by other agents j,
k,. . . at time tj , tk,. . . and executed at time tj + δtj, tk + δtk,. . . (see Fig. 1):
p(τi + δτi) = p(τi) +
τi+δτi∑
τˆ=τi+1
I[a(τˆ ), τˆ ] (1)
where I is the price impact function, that is, the price change due to a market
or limit order, and a(τ ′) is the sign and size of the order placed at time τ ′.
2The discussion below extends previous work (Challet and Galla 2005) to a finer time
scale.
3It is an order to buy/sell immediately at the best price. More patient traders place
limit orders at or beyond best prices, thus obtaining a better deal.
4The smallest reaction time is around 1s for the DAX. J.-P. Bouchaud, private discus-
sion.
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The presence of τ as a variable of I allows for a(τ ′) being a limit order that
modifies I. For the sake of simplicity, only market orders and linear impact
I(x) = x (Farmer 1999) will be considered here. In that case,
p(τi + δτi) = p(τi) + A(τi, δτi) (2)
where A is the accumulated price impact between τi + 1 and τi + δτi
A(τi, δτi) =
δτi∑
τ˜=1
a(τi + τ˜) =
δτi∑
τ˜=1
∑
j
aj(τj)δτi+τ˜ ,τj+δτj , (3)
where the sum
∑
j is over all the traders possibly interested in trading this
particular asset and selects the agents whose transactions were executed be-
tween τi and τi + δτi. Equation (3) means that the group of traders with
which trader i interacts through market impact is different at each trans-
action, and that among this group, everyone has a different but partially
common interacting group.
The position is held for some time. At τ ′i , the trader decides to close his
position, obtaining for the same reason as before p(τ ′i + δτ
′
i). His real payoff
is
ai[p(τ
′
i + δτ
′
i)− p(τi + δτi)] = −aiA(τi, δτi)
+ai
∑
τi+δτi<τ≤τ ′i
a(τ)
−(−ai)A(τ
′
i , δτ
′
i). (4)
The first and the last terms come from market impact and reaction time.
They are minority-game payoffs, which can be recognised at once by their
‘−’ sign: one’s market impact is reduced if one acts against the crowd (in this
case, this means taking an action opposite to the majority of orders executed
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during the time delay). The central term, which has a ‘+’ sign, represents
the capital gain that could be achieved without reaction time nor market
impact. It describes a delayed majority game, that is, a majority game to
which trader i does not take part: whereas A(τi, δi) and A(τ
′
i , δτ
′
i) contain a
contribution of trader i, the middle term does not.
The nature of financial markets depends therefore on the trading fre-
quency and reaction time of each trader, and on the activity of the mar-
ket: the relative importance of minority games decreases as the holding time
τ ′i + δτ
′
i − τi − δτi increases; reversely, somebody who trades at each time
step plays a minority game which is therefore the only consistent payoff in
such a model where the time is not a coarse-grained quantity (e.g. a day).
Interestingly, this is consistent with the behaviour of market makers who try
and stabilise the price so as to minimise inventory risk, thereby inducing a
mean-reverting behaviour, as in the minority game.
The case of a limit order is not more complicated: if at time τi agent i
places a limit order at −ai∆i (∆i > 0) from the best price with timeout Ti,
he expects that the majority of both price and limit orders will opposite to
his, thereby obtaining a better price. Thus such a person is not only more
patient, but also plays a minority game and fixes his reward. If his limit
order is not executed before its timeout, the trader may place a new limit
order at the same distance from the best price, which may have changed,
and wait again. In this case, the price movement during the period where
his first order was not executed is akin to increase δti by Ti.
At this stage of the discussion a comparison between this market mech-
anism and the $-game is in order. In the $-game, a trader is rewarded if he
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buys a share at time t′, whose price increases at next time step t′ + 1: the
payoff of trader i is ai(t
′)A(t′ + 1), t′ being a physical discrete time that can
be seen as a coarsening of t or τ ; therefore, a $-game also contains a delayed
majority game. Replacing t′+1 by τi+δτ and assuming that trader i opens a
position at time τ and closes it at time τ + δτ , makes the $-game payoff look
like Eq. (4) without market impact or reaction time, i.e. without minority
games. There are three possible ways for that kind of payoff to appear: i)
one knows in advance one’s exact impact A(τi), which seems implausible; ii)
one’s reaction time is negligible, which only happens for infrequently traded
stocks and if the size of the market order is smaller than the volume avail-
able at the best price, provided that the best prices do not change during
the submission of the order; iii) the holding time δt is very large, in which
limit market impact becomes much smaller than the price return δt. The
fundamental problem in all these cases is that in the $-game, A(t′ + 1) also
contains the contribution of trader i as it forces the traders to be active at
each time step and does not make it possible for the agents to hold and close
their positions explicitly; a $-game payoff is therefore inconsistent. Note fi-
nally that if the agents have expectations on the nature of the market, that
is, on the middle term of Eq. (4), the $-game payoff reduces to one time
step, t′, and is a minority payoff for contrarians (−a(t′)A(t′)) and a majority
payoff (a(t′)A(t′)) for trend-followers (Marsili 2001).
The above discussion clearly shows the need for a strategy space that
allows for holding a position, and above that gives real reasons to open and
close positions. The experience of the Minority Game and El Farol bar
problem suggests that the size of the strategy space should not depend on N
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in order to make the model amenable to analytical solution.
2 A model of speculation
Finding a simple though meaningful speculation strategy space is surprisingly
easy when examining the reasons why real traders open and close a position.
It is reasonable to assume that they base their decisions on signals or patterns,
such as mispricing (over/undervaluation), technical analysis, crossing of mov-
ing averages, news, etc. How to close a position is a matter of more variations:
one can assume a fixed-time horizon, stop gains, stop losses, etc. I assume
that the traders are inactive unless they receive some signal because some
known pattern arises; this is to be compared with the many models where the
agents trade at each time step (Lux and Marchesi 1999, Hommes 2005, Chal-
let and Zhang 1997). Therefore, the agents hold their positions between pat-
terns. All the kinds of information regarded as possibly relevant by all the
traders form the ensemble of the patterns which is assumed to be countable
and finite.
Each trader recognises only a few patterns, because he has access to or
can analyse only a limited number of information sources, or because he
does not regard the other ones as relevant; in the present model, a trader
is assigned at random a small set of personal patterns which is kept fixed
during the whole duration of the simulation. Every time one of his patterns
arises, he decides whether to open/close a position according to his measure
of the average return between all the pairs of patterns that he is able to
recognise. This is precisely how people using crossings of moving averages
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behave: take the case of a trader comparing two exponential moving averages
(EMA) EMA100 and EMA200, with memory of 100, respectively 200 days:
such trader is inactive unless EMA100 and EMA200 cross; the two types of
crossing define two signals, or patterns. For instance, a set of patterns could
be the 20 possible crossings between EMAs with memory length of 10, 20,
50, 100 and 200 days.
The hope and the role of a trader are to identify pairs of patterns such that
the average price return between two patterns is larger than some benchmark,
for instance a risk-free rate (neglecting risk for the sake of simplicity); in this
sense the agents follow the past average trend between two patterns, which
makes sense if the average return is significantly different from the risk-free
rate. In contrast with many other models (e.g. Lux and Marchesi (1999)), the
agents do not switch between trend-followers/fundamentalist/noise traders
during the course of the simulation.
Defining what ‘average return’ precisely means leads to the well-known
problem of measuring returns of trading strategies in a back-testing, i.e.,
without actually using them. This is due to market impact and results usually
in worse-than-expected gains when a strategy is used. Estimating correctly
one’s market impact is therefore a crucial but impossible aspect of back-
testing because of two types of delusions. The first, temporal inaccuracy, is
due to the over/underestimation of reaction time. Self-impact on the other
hand is the impact that a real trade has on the price and market, which is
not present in data used for back-testing. Both of them cause imprecision
in estimating returns of strategies not being used and, accordingly, both are
actively investigated by practitioners. In the following one will call naive the
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agents who cannot measure exactly the market impact, while sophisticated
agents will be those who can.
2.1 Definition
The mathematical definition of the model is as follows: N traders can submit
buy orders (+1) or sell orders (−1) or just be inactive. They base their
decisions on patterns, denoted by µ, and taking values 1, · · · , P . Each trader
i = 1, · · · , N is able to recognise S patterns µi,1, · · · , µi,S, drawn at random
and uniformly from {1, · · · , P} before the simulations commence; he is active,
i.e., may wish to buy or sell one share of stock, only when the current pattern
µ(t) is in his pattern list, that is, µ(t) ∈ {µi,1, · · · , µi,S}. The kind of position
he might take (ai(t) ∈ {0,±1}) is determined by the average price return
between two consecutive occurrences of patterns. The time unit is that of
pattern change, i.e., at each time step, µ(t) changes and is unique; for the time
being, µ(t) is drawn at random and uniformly from 1, · · · , P . The duration
of a time step is assumed to be larger than the time needed to place an order.
The order in which agents’ actions arrive is disregarded. Therefore, at time
t, the volume is V (t) =
∑
i |ai(t)| and the excess return A(t) =
∑N
i=1 ai(t)
results in a (log-) price change of
p(t+ 1) = p(t) + A(t). (5)
p(t + 1), not p(t), is the price actually obtained by the people who placed
their order at time t. Note that if the order of agents’ actions were taken
into account, one would first assign a random rank to the orders (possibly
influenced by agents’ reaction time); then the price obtained by the n-th
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order would be p(t) + A(t)n(t)/V (t); if the reaction of all the agents is the
same, the average effect of order arrival is irrelevant on average.
There are several ways to compute returns between two patterns. Assume
that µ(t) = µ and that t′ > t is the first subsequent occurrence of pattern ν:
p(t′) − p(t) is the price difference between these two patterns that does not
take into account price impact, whereas p(t′ + 1) − p(t + 1) is the realistic
price difference. Agent i perceives a cumulative price return Ui,µ→ν between
pattern µ and ν which evolves according to
Ui,µ→ν(t
′+1) = Ui,µ→ν(t)+p(t
′+1)−p(t+1)−(1−|ai(t)|)ζi[A(t
′)−A(t)]. (6)
when pattern µ has appeared but not ν yet, and stays constant otherwise; ζ
is the naivety factor: agents have ζi = 1 and fail to take reaction time into
account properly, while or sophisticated, agents have ζi = 0 and compute
perfectly the average price return. Finally, the variable |ai(t)| states whether
the agent has opened/closed a position at time t (|ai(t)| = 1), or was inactive
(|ai(t)| = 0). When an agent trades, he perceives perfectly the effect of his
reaction time whatever ζi. In practice, ζi 6= 0, and can be of any sign and
value. This is because estimating reaction time exactly is impossible: even
if real traders are often acutely aware of its importance, they always over or
underestimate it.
An agent only opens position between two of his patterns µ and ν if the
average price return between them is larger than ǫ > 0, that is, if |Ui,µ→ν| >
ǫtµ→ν where tµ→ν is the total number of time-steps elapsed between patterns
µ and ν.
A further specification is that an agent trades between his E best pairs
of patterns, where E ≤ S(S − 1)/2 is his maximal exposure, as one cannot
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trade from µ to ν and from ν to µ at the same time. If E < S(S − 1)/2,
the agent aims at trading only between his most profitable patterns; in this
sense, the present model could be called the pattern game. In the following,
the simplest case S = 2, E = 1 is analysed. The dynamics becomes simpler:
when µ(t) = µi,1, if |Uµi,1→µi,2 | > ǫtµi,1→µi,2 , he buys one share (Ui,µ1→µ2(t) >
0) or short-sells one share (Ui,µ1→µ2(t) < 0)
5, and holds his position until
µ(t) = µi,2. When an agent closes and opens the same kind of position, he
simply keeps his position open.
Thus the basic model has five parameters: N , S, P , ǫ and E and has the
following ingredients: the agents are adaptive and heterogeneous, they have
limited cognition abilities, and they can be naive or sophisticated.
Relevant quantities include the variance of A
σ2 =
〈A2〉 − 〈A〉2
P
, (7)
the predictability seen by the naive agents
J =
1
P (P − 1)
∑
µ,ν,µ6=ν
〈A(t)|µ→ ν〉2, (8)
where 〈A(t)|µ→ ν〉 stands for the average price return per time step between
the occurrence of µ at time t and the next occurrence of ν. J measures
predictability that the naive agents with ζ = 0 hope to exploit; it is in fact
related to absolute value of the average increase of Uµ→ν of naive agents per
time step. Another closely related quantity is
K =
1
P (P − 1)
∑
µ,ν,µ6=ν
〈A(t+ 1)|µ→ ν〉2 (9)
5Short-selling consists in selling shares that one does not own. Closing such a position
consists in buying back the stock later at a hopefully lower price.
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is the actual exploitable predictability which is relevant to the sophisticated
agents. Finally, a measure of price bias conditional to market states is given
by the average return conditional to a given pattern
H =
∑
µ〈A|µ〉
2
P
. (10)
[Figure 2 around here]
Before carrying out numerical simulations, one should keep in mind that
the price is bounded between −N and +N , since the traders are not allowed
to have an exposure larger than 1. Assume that ǫ = 0, and that all the
scores have small random initial valuation (otherwise nobody trades in the
first place). One observes in such case beginnings of bubbles or anti-bubbles,
the price rising or decreasing to ±N , and then staying constant. Indeed, the
price increase/decrease is echoed in the scores of all the agents, which have all
the same sign, therefore all stipulate the same action. The price is stuck (Fig
2), as nobody wants to close his position, because everybody is convinced
that the price should carry on on its way up/down. This phenomenon is
found for all values of ζ .
[Figure 3 around here]
Figure 3 illustrates the typical price time series for ǫ > 0: first a bubble,
then a waiting time until some traders begin to withdraw from the market.
The price goes back to 0 and then fluctuates for a while. How these fluctua-
tions are interpreted by the agents depends on ζ and ǫ: increasing ζ makes
it more difficult for the agents to understand that they should refrain from
trading, because they are not capable of disentangling their own contribu-
tion from these fluctuations. Accordingly, the larger ζ , the later the agents
withdraw from the market, and the smaller ǫ, the longer it takes (Fig. 4).
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In this figure, the maximum number of iteration was capped at 106; naive
agents need therefore a very long time before withdrawing if ǫ is small. The
scaling Tw ∝ N/ǫ holds only for small ζ and ǫ. For large ǫ, ζ does not matter
much.
[Figure 4 around here]
All the agents eventually withdraw from the market. This makes complete
sense, as there is no reason to trade. Naivety results in a diminished ability
to withdraw rapidly enough from a non-predictable market, and, as a by-
product, in larger price fluctuations. This is consistent with the fact that
volatility in real markets is much larger than if the traders were as rational
as mainstream Economics theory assumes (see e.g. Shiller (1981)). Naivety,
an unavoidable deviation from rationality, is suggested here as one possible
cause of excess volatility.
2.2 Noise traders
[Figure 5 around here]
As the traders try and measure average returns, adding noise to the price
evolution (A(t)→ A(t)+Nnη(t)) where η(t) is uniformly distributed between
−1 and 1) does not provide any trading opportunity, but makes it more
difficult to estimate precisely average returns. Accordingly, the agents should
withdraw later, and the larger ζ , the later. This is precisely what happens:
Fig 5 reports the average behaviour of Tw for sophisticated and naive agents.
One can therefore reinterpret this figure as an additional clue that naive
agents are blinded by the fluctuations that they produce themselves.
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2.3 Market impact heterogeneity
Real traders are heterogeneous in more than one way. In a population where
each trader has his own ζi, people with a small ζi evaluate gain opportunities
better. This also means that the impact of people with large ζi provides
predictability to the agents with a lower ζi, and therefore the former are
exploited by the latter, giving a good reason to trade to sophisticated agents
as long as naive agents are active.
2.4 Market information structure
Up to now, the model showed how hard it is not to trade. But how hard is
it to make the agents want to trade? The problem is that they try to detect
and exploit predictability, but that there is none when all the agents have the
same abilities (e.g. the same ζi). They might be fooled for a while by price
fluctuations, as they try to detect trends between patterns, but eventually
realise that there is no reason to trade. This is why the heterogeneity of
the agents is crucial in this model. For instance, sophisticated agents would
continue to trade if new naive agents replaced those who had understood
their mistake. This would however probably preclude any hope to solve the
model exactly. This is why I shall assume a different kind of heterogeneity.
I will assume that there are people, the producers, who need to trade for
other reasons than mere speculation (Zhang 1999, Challet, Marsili and Zhang
2000): they use the market but make their living outside of it. Doing so they
do not withdraw from the market, inject predictability and are exploited by
the speculators. A simple way to include Np producers in the model is to
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assume that they induce a bias in the excess demand that depends on µ(t),
i.e., A(t) = A
µ(t)
prod + Aspec(t). Each producer has a fixed contribution ±1 to
Aµprod, drawn at random and equiprobably from {−1,+1} for each µ and each
producer, hence Aµprod ∝
√
Np. In that way, the amount of market impact
predictability introduced in the model is well controlled.
If there is no information structure in the market, i.e., if µ(t) does not de-
pend at all on past patterns or price history, the effect of producers is akin to
that of noise traders, hence, the speculators cannot exploit the predictability
left by the producers. This is because the speculators need temporal cor-
relations between occurring biases in order to exploit them, which happens
when the transitions between market states are not equiprobable, i.e., when
the transition matrix between patternsW is such thatWµ→ν 6= 1/P . This as-
sumption is supported by empirical results: Marsili (2002) determined states
of the market with a clustering method, and found that the transitions be-
tween the states is highly non-random and has long-term memory which one
neglects. Numerically, one chose to fix Wµ→ν to a random number between 0
and 1 and then normalised the transition probabilities; the variance ofWµ→ν
is a parameter of the model which controls the amount of correlation between
biases induced by the producers. It should be noted that the speculators are
not able remove the global price bias because of the linearity of the price im-
pact function. As a consequence, one should ensure that the effective average
price return bias introduced by the producers is zero; it is nothing else but
the sum of the components of Aprod weighted by the frequency of appearance
of µ, which is obtained from W∞.
[Figure 7 around here]
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Adding more producers, that is, more predictable market impact, in-
creases linearly the values of inter-pattern price return predictability mea-
sures J and K, as well as the average price impact H and the fluctuations of
the price σ2. Then, keeping fixed the number of producers and their actions,
adding more and more sophisticated speculators first decreases the fluctu-
ations σ2, the price impact H , and the exploitable predictability measures
J and K (Fig. 7); then all these quantities reach a minimum at an N of
order P 2, that is, of the order of the number of pairs of patterns. At the
same time, the average total number of speculators in the market, denoted
by 〈Nact〉, reaches a plateau, thus the speculators are able to refrain from
trading when predictability falls below some value determined by ǫ. The
fact that the fluctuations σ2 increase for N > P (P − 1)/2 means that the
agents with the same pair of patterns enter and withdraw from the market
in a synchronous way, leaving 〈Nact〉, H , J and K constant. Avoiding such
synchronicity can be realised by letting the agents have heterogeneous ǫi or
ζi. The average gain of the speculators is positive when their number is small
enough but becomes negative for at N ≃ P (P − 1)/2 in Fig 7; if evolving
capitals were implemented, less speculators would survive, which would lower
the effective N , thus keeping the average gain at or above zero. This would
also reduce or suppress the increase of σ2.
The relationship between the producers and the speculators can be de-
scribed as a symbiosis: without producers, the speculators do not trade;
without speculators, the producers lose more on average, as the speculators
reduce H . This picture, remarkably similar to that of the Minority Game
with producers (Challet, Marsili and Zhang 2000, Challet, Chessa, Marsili
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and Zhang 2000, Zhang 2001), justifies fully in retrospect the study of infor-
mation ecology with minority games.
[Figure 6 around here]
Guided by the knowledge that any mechanism subordinated to a random
walk and responsible for making the agents switch between being in and out
of the market produces volatility clustering (Bouchaud, Giardina and Me´zard
2001), one expects the emergence of such property in this model when the
number of agents is large and ǫ > 0. This is exactly what happens, as shown
by Fig. 6, where the volume Nact displays a long term memory. Whether
this model is able to reproduce faithfully real-market phenomenology is under
investigation.
The similarity of information ecology between this model and the MG
is a clue that the MG has some relevance for financial market modelling,
and suggests to reinterpret it. Generally speaking, a minority mechanism is
found when agents compete for a limited resource, that is, when they try
to determine by trial and error the (sometimes implicit) resource level, and
synchronise their actions so that the demand equals the resource on average
(Challet et al. 2004, Challet 2004). As a consequence, an agent is tempted
to exploit the resource more than his fair share, hoping that the other agents
happen to take a smaller share of it. The limited resource in financial mar-
kets is predictability and indeed information ecology has proven to be one of
the most fascinating and plausible insights of minority games into market
dynamics (Challet, Marsili and Zhang 2000, Challet, Chessa, Marsili and
Zhang 2000). Instead of regarding A(t) in the MG as the instantaneous ex-
cess demand, one should reinterpret it as the deviation from unpredictability
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A = 0 at time t. The two actions can be for instance to exploit an inef-
ficiency (+1) or to refrain from it (−1); A in this context would measure
how efficiently an inefficiency is being exploited. Then everything becomes
clearer: the fact that A(t) display mean-reverting behaviour is not problem-
atic any more as it is not a price return. It simply means when the agents
tend to under-exploit some predictability, they are likely to exploit it more
in the next time steps, and reversely. What price return correspond to a
given A is not specified by the MG, but herding in the information space
(the MG) should translate into interesting dynamics of relevant financial
quantities such as volume and price; for instance, dynamical correlations of
|A| in the MG probably correspond to dynamical correlations in the volume
of transactions. Therefore, studying the building up of volatility feedback,
long-range memory and fat-tailed A still makes sense, but not in a view to
model explicitly price returns.
3 Conclusion
This model provides a new simple yet remarkably rich market modelling
framework. It is readily extendable, and many relevant modifications are
to be studied. The similarity of information ecology between the present
model and the MG is striking and allowed for reinterpretation of the MG as
model of competition for predictability, and substantiated the use of the MG
to study predictability ecology of financial markets. Whether the proposed
model is exactly solvable is under scrutiny.
Source code available at www.maths.ox.ac.uk/~challet.
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Figure 1: Time axis showing the intertwined nature of transactions caused
by physical delays
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Figure 2: Price time series with ǫ = 0 (N = 1000, P = 32, S = 2, ζ = 0)
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Figure 3: Price time series with ǫ = 0.01 (N = 1000, P = 32, S = 2). Black
lines are for naive traders and green lines are for sophisticated traders.
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Figure 4: Scaled time to withdraw as a function of ǫ. P = 10, N = 50
(full symbols) and 100 (empty symbols), ζ = 0 (circles), 0.75 (squares), 0.85
(diamonds) and 1 (triangles); average over 500 samples
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Figure 5: Scaled time to withdraw as a function of Nn. P = 10, N = 100,
ǫ = 0.1, ζ = 0 (circles) and 1 (squares); average over 500 samples
29
10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
time step
0
100
200
300
400
500
N
ac
t
Figure 6: Number of active speculators as a function of time (P = 10,
N = 1000, Np = 100000, ǫ = 0.001)
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Figure 7: Volatility σ2 (circles), price impact H/P (squares), naive pre-
dictability J (down triangles) and sophisticated predictability K (up trian-
gles), scaled fraction of active speculators (diamonds), and average gain per
speculator and per time step (right triangles); P = 5, Np = 10, ǫ = 0.05;
average over 10000 samples of speculators
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